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of our knowledge of the children's book trade in the century after John Newbury. It adds a

few names to a familiar list, but partakes of the same antiquarianism as earlier scholarship.

Jackson does usually avoid the anachronistic standards of judgment and the limited sympa-

thies that warped former histories. One can hope that the work will inspire interest in this

amazing subject, even if it does not ask very searching questions about authors or readers.

University of Florida C. JOHN SOMMERVILLE

David Lieberman. The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-

Cenitury Britain. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1989. Pp. xiv, 312. $44.50.

David Lieberman's lucid and sure-footed reinterpretation of late-eighteenth- and early-

nineteenth-century jurisprudence is original, thoughtful, analytically acute, and a pleasure

to read. Lieberman argues that Bentham's law reform ideas must be viewed in relation to

earlier (and contemporary) reform traditions. Bentham's views were more complex than the

long-held myth would have it, partly because they were more derivative, at least in his early

enterprises, combining as they did a reception of earlier notions with the novelty for which

he is usually credited. Blackstone and Mansfield, on this account, were not the match stick

figures they are sometimes made out to be; the former was not the complacentjurist oblivious

to the need for reform, and the latter was not the purely instrumentalist, piece meal reformer

who lacked a sense of system that embraced the most fundamental ideas of common law

and equity. As Lieberman shows, both Blackstone and Mansfield sought to create a system

of common law and legislation in which fundamental principles dominated, and wherein

what was fundamental rested upon a principled melding of custom and reason. Both sought

to simplify and to prune the law, to make it more widely accessible and acceptable, not only

for its usefulness, but also for its appeal to an ethically-based and rational embodiment of

tradition. And both shared the widespread impression that, as things stood, Parliament not

only lacked the ability to undertake such reform, but was in fact engaged in a legislative

spree that threatened to obscure - or even destroy - whatever coherence the common law

still possessed. Neither succeeded in constructing a truly new, "scientific" form of legisla-

tion; therein lay Bentham's originality, but even Bentham could not have achieved his

breakthrough without having worked toward it on the basis of the principles (including a

kind of "science of legislation") of the earlier reform traditions.

In his analysis of the Commentaries Lieberman argues convincingly that Blackstone's

passages on parliamentary sovereignty did not render his discussion elsewhere of natural

law mere "lip-service." We are left, as Lieberman shows, having to reconstruct Blackstone's

understanding of the dilemma posed by Parliament's de jure sovereignty in a world in which

truly "good" law had to meet certain ultimate standards. And that reconstruction requires an

understanding of the role of natural law in Blackstone's "account of common law legitima-

cy." Of course, the problem of sovereignty melts away if one accepts the will of Parliament

as necessarily reflecting the ultimate judgment on the true ("natural") principles of English

law. Blackstone surely understood that point, but he found it difficult to conceive of

Parliament in that way. Lieberman might have said more on this matter, for which he has

well laid the foundations. If Blackstone - among many others - thought Parliament incapa-

ble of creating a coherent system of law, he surely found it difficult to believe that statute

was of necessity an expression of the very natural law principles upon which he thought
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such a system must ultimately be based. In the end, Blackstone, as Lieberman states,

recognized the "evasiveness" of his position (p. 55), and left us an account that we ought

neither to make more coherent than it was (by not taking his natural law language seriously)

nor to make less coherent than it was (by losing sight of Blackstone's principled approach

to distinguishing good from bad common law). Lieberman's analysis of Blackstone's

"science of legislation" must be read together with the brief but insightful ensuing chapter

on "Equity, Principle and Precedent." Blackstone saw the common law as both principle and

precedent; the common law contained its own equitable side, and equity, like the common

law, was bound by precedent for reasons of stability and expectations. The natural-law

element of common law is now seen as uniting with equity, which Blackstone did not

consider an entirely separate system. Judicial "reform" of the law, which (relative to

Parliament) could amount to a preemptive strike, becomes a model for what legislative

reform ought to be.

There was a tension, of course, between Blackstone's adherence to precedent (in com-

mon-law opinions) for reasons of stability and certainty and his insistence that Parliament

remove excrescences upon the law that were the unfortunate result of ad hoc historical

developments. Parliament is adjured to prune away rules that a common law court might

feel bound to follow in a given case. Too little is said, perhaps, about the difference between

adjudication of a case at hand in a common law court and alteration of the law, in the abstract

(as it were), by legislative decree. Nonetheless, taken together, the first three chapters of

Lieberman's book constitute a remarkable reconstruction of a Blackstonean system of

jurisprudence that embodied reformist principles, natural law boundaries, and a theory of

precedent that was in constant tension with both.

Toward the close of Chapter 3, Lieberman remarks that Mansfield "took precedents to be

illustrations of those rational principles which were the essence of common law," and he

argues that "if common law was principle, then the law resembled equity" (pp. 86-87). This,

Lieberman concludes, was a theory that gave the common law considerable flexibility.

Subsequent chapters then reveal Mansfield at his most flexible, while making a convincing

case for his adherence to what he took to be settled common-law principles, or "natural

principles" upon which the common law ought to be settled. Mansfield's contemporaries

quite understandably exaggerated the degree to which he departed from the common law

or- more to Lieberman's point- failed to understand that Mansfield himself believed he

was remaining within the appropriate bounds of the common law. It should be pointed out

that if Mansfield's English contemporaries misunderstood what he was attempting to do, so,

too, did those who viewed him from afar. Jefferson, among others, saw Mansfield as

dangerous because arbitrary, as a threat to the natural-law (and so, presumably, to the

immutable) quality of the common law. Lieberman would have much to offer should he turn

in future work to the American assessment of Mansfield or, for that matter, to the relationship

between Joseph Story's science of the law (developed in part as a defense against those who

favored legislative codification) and Mansfield's own (as Lieberman subtly places it)

anti-legislative theory of common-law reasoning.

Finally, Lieberman's discussion of Blackstone's more "conservative" approach to prece-

dent (i.e., more conservative than Mansfield's), is effectively reintroduced. Lieberman

shows how Bentham seized on this difference in the Fragment, reviling Blackstone for his

conservatism, and siding with Mansfield, despite the fact that the latter had wanted to scuttle

precedent to achieve judicial, as opposed to legislative, reform of the common law. The
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counterpoint among the major characters has by this point become one of the central devices

of Lieberman's book.

Lord Kames is a welcome addition to the cast of characters, and to our attempts to

understand the transition from Blackstone to Bentham. Lieberman's detour northward

involves a masterly and economical placing of Kames, whose general principles of moral

and legal development are smoothly set forth; the ironies of the Scottish situation, both

domestically and in relation to the Westminster-based Parliament, are artfully sketched.

Kames prefigured Benthamite principles of utility but, quite naturally, looked to the

bench - not the legislature - as the obvious institution for reform. Lieberman points out that

Kames practically turned the court of equity into a mini-legislature and shared his

contemporaries' misreading of Mansfield. This establishes, it seems to me, yet a further

irony: Mansfield was, in fact, a principled judicial common-law reformer, not a quasi-legisla-

tor (i.e., not a purely instrumentalist reformer of common law); Kames saw him largely as

the latter, and so was well disposed toward the process of judge-based reform. Had Kames

known the true Mansfield, he might - but for the "accidental" reasons that made parliament-

ary reform of Scottish law most unlikely -have tilted in the other (legislative) direction.

Having brought the varieties of common-law reform to light - and life - Lieberman turns to

legislative reform. Here the common lawyers' doubts about legislative tinkering with the

common law (and about creation of new legal rules generally) reappear, this time through

the eyes of Daines Barrington. Consolidation and classification ("Baconian" reform) was

invoked in the period, but little more. Even in penal law the reformist impulse was limited

to revision of the law of sanctions. Once again, contemporaries' misunderstandings are

central to the story: Bentham saw in Barrington a real ally and a contrast to Blackstone; in

fact, Barrington and Blackstone had much in common -Bentham failed to see that Black-

stone, too, had a prescription for some kind of legislative reform.

Because Lieberman's concluding chapters on Bentham succeed in placing Bentham in

relation to those who went before, he is able to characterize and analyze a great deal of

Bentham's jurisprudence in short compass-truly a tour de force. The transition from

Bentham's modest science of consolidation and classification to his true science of legisla-

tion is effectively handled and gains its interest largely from the long-range perspective

Lieberman has provided. Bentham's critique of common law (really, non-law) is familiar,

but against the background of all that has gone before, it takes on welcome freshness. It must

be recalled that Bentham caricatured Blackstone, but, as Lieberman shows, Bentham well

understood his predecessors' complex and varied arguments regarding the nature of the

common law (if not always their attitudes toward legislation). Thus, Bentham's (eventual)

radical anti-common-law position can not be passed off as a reaction against a simplistic

identification of common law with natural law. It was, this fine book argues, a conscious

rejection of the far more sophisticated notion of the "reason" of the law that Mansfield and

others, as well as Blackstone, had set forth.

University of Michigan THOMAS A. GREEN
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